On Dretske's zebra
laxminarayan lenka (2007-2-21 0:50, 305 bytes)
laxminarayan lenka
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Dr. Laxminarayan Lenka, NEHU, Shillon-22, India Date 2007-2-21 1:00 |
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abstract
We do not know anything because we do not know the very thing that follows from anything we know. This important form of argument for skepticism presupposes the Principle of Knowledge Closure: Conjunction of a known implication and its known antecedent guarantees that the consequent is known. This paper's first part contains an exposition of (a) The Dream Argument, (b)The Evil Genius Argument and (c)The Brain-in-a -vat Argument as arguments for skepticism in the said important form and how each of these arguments presupose the principle of Knowledge Closure.
Dretske's Zebra case challenges the validity of Knowledge Closure and, thereby, the validity of certain skeptical arguments. Klein and Stine have criticized the zebra case on different grounds. In the 2nd part of this paper, I try to show that the principle of Knowledge Closure can be challenged in a way that overcomes the criticisms of Klein and Stine, without defeating the purpose of the Zebra case.
Dretske's Zebra case challenges the validity of Knowledge Closure and, thereby, the validity of certain skeptical arguments. Klein and Stine have criticized the zebra case on different grounds. In the 2nd part of this paper, I try to show that the principle of Knowledge Closure can be challenged in a way that overcomes the criticisms of Klein and Stine, without defeating the purpose of the Zebra case.
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