Phenomenology and Scientific Verifiability
            __________________________________________

                         Thomas O'Neill 

                    Ripon College (alumnus) 
                          TJPAO@aol.com 

                   (received: June 18, 1997)

	Maurice Merleau-Ponty's brand of phenomenology, near the end of a 
trail that started with such philosophers as Kant and Fichte, has been 
embraced by many, for there are many elements of this philosophical stance 
which seem favorable to contemporary philosophers.  For example, there is a 
certain element of security in the notion that one cannot know the other as 
subject, as well as the reciprocal.  One's thoughts and ideas are one's own; 
they do not belong to the plethora of people which one encounters in one's 
day-to-day activities.  Thus, phenomenology obviously has some significant 
advantages over other philosophical positions.  One can take great comfort in 
what appears to be a guaranteed privacy from strangers and (often more 
importantly) from those close to us.  In a world in which so much is quite 
easily revealed to the masses, a great premium has been placed on privacy, and 
phenomenology allows us a certain level of this treasure which not even the 
internet can take from us.(1)
 
	Yet, one attains this level of comfort only at the expense of another 
type of security, also hinging on an issue of certainty.(2)  Most human beings 
rely to a large extent on scientific discoveries in every facet of their 
lives.  It is not always a conscious reliance, but it is nonetheless 
(seemingly) omnipresent.  This sentence, for example, would not have left my 
lips were it not for such discoveries as I alluded to just previously.  One 
comes to accept these scientific discoveries because of a level of certainty 
which one takes as given when "science" is involved.  In fact, that many 
scientific advances have been incorporated into our daily lives with 
immeasurable ease is evidence of the fact that we accept scientific advances 
with this type of certainty.  This adherence to two fundamentally different 
philosophical positions is the source of significant tension between 
scientific progression and phenomenological philosophy, for the 
phenomenological stance promulgated by Merleau-Ponty is not conducive to 
scientific progression in the manner in which science is presently known to 
advance.(3)
 
	The advancement of science in general relies on the repeatability of 
experiments, for the purposes of (among other things) verification.  Without 
the ability to verify a scientist's findings, one will never be certain as to 
whether or not the discovery is in fact a worthwhile advance (as opposed to 
being merely a fluke or an outright error).  Also, if an experiment is not 
repeatable, then it is worthless (or, at least not worth very much), for what 
was discovered is of no value if it cannot be re-executed in order to use the 
findings in the future.(4)  Thus, it is imperative that scientific experiments 
be repeatable; this is evident from what has been stated above.  So far, 
consequently, there does not seem to be any trouble, yet it does rest on the 
horizon.  For, this is the issue which brings Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology 
and scientific progression into conflict.(5)
 
	The point at which these two "doctrines" (or "positions") come into 
conflict, specifically, is a key notion in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, namely 
what he means by "situation."  According to Merleau- Ponty, a "situation" 
(like anything else in his philosophical system) is not atomistic; it is not 
discrete.(6) There is no way of separating one situation (or, "event") from 
another; essentially, they are internally related.  Changes in one would 
necessarily result in changes in the other.  Given the fact that situations 
are not discrete and that, as a result, one cannot isolate one specific 
situation, it is impossible to truly recreate an experiment, for a true 
recreation would involve the isolation of a specific event, in this case a 
certain experiment, for the purposes of repeating it, and this is simply 
impossible.  Since an experiment (as part of a situation) cannot be isolated 
as a discrete moment, then it cannot be reproduced as another discrete 
"entity."  For this, according to Merleau-Ponty, there are many reasons.(7)  
Situations are not discrete, says Merleau-Ponty, because they are completely 
tied to previous situations as the foreground of a painting is to its 
background; the situation as the object of one's focus (or, attention; both 
capture what Merleau-Ponty intends) is part of a greater "field" of 
perception, consisting of numerous intertwined elements for which one cannot 
account entirely; it is far too complex.(8)
 
	The consequence of this aspect of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, namely 
that one cannot know entirely (and therefore not reproduce completely) a given 
situation deals a crippling blow to science as it is presently understood.  If 
one cannot reproduce one's results, then verifiability becomes impossible, and 
the progression (forward) of science is subsequently brought to a halt.  This 
immediately strikes the reader as counterintuitive; it is salient that science 
*does* progress, for the examples given earlier are evident to nearly every 
human being.  Can the entire human race be mistaken about what is central to 
its existence?  Of course not.  But, the reasons for this are not nearly as 
evident as the fact that Merleau-Ponty is mistaken. The intuition (i.e. that 
science progresses) is correct, but the reasons why this intuition is correct 
are not so immediate.  The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to discuss 
what Merleau-Ponty says about "situations," the implications of this view for 
science (meant broadly), and why Merleau-Ponty must be mistaken.
 
	Merleau-Ponty's definition of "situation" is central to his 
philosophy, as well as central to the blow which his philosophical system 
deals to science; this definition (the definition of "situation" is the core 
of the problem.  To Merleau-Ponty, a "situation" is not what people commonly 
understand it to be. Yet, upon carefully developed urgings, one could quite 
easily be backed into the corner in which Merleau- Ponty backs science.  If 
one were to ask Person X what a situation is, a typical response might be, 
"Uhhh . . . an event?"  The answer would not be immediate, and the response 
would not be confident (unless the person asked were a philosopher, but I 
specified an average, or normal, person, and philosophers simply do not 
qualify as normal).  The result is tautological; the person provides a 
synonym, but no new information is given; one receives no insight from the 
answer.
 
	Another attempt would be to cite an example of a situation, and though 
an example is not a definition, it does bring us further than the tautology 
given above.  Person Y, then, might cite the bombing of Hiroshima as an event, 
a "situation."  But, this too, is destined to lead us into a philosophical cul 
de sac.  For, when pressed as to when this (or any) situation started and 
ended, Person Y is left with nothing more than a disgruntled look and a 
feeling of frustration (if not complete anger).  It would be perfectly normal 
to argue that the situation began when the bombardier pulled the lever.  But 
would it?  Some might say that it began when the bomb was released, and others 
could make a strong case for the situation's beginning with the conception of 
the "Manhattan Project."  Further, any of the three of these stances (plus the 
innumerable possibilities which were omitted solely for the sake of time and 
to keep the length of this paper manageable) could be argued, yielding the 
result that, as Merleau-Ponty argues in the *Phenomenology of Perception* (and 
elsewhere), that a "situation" is not discrete; it has no clear beginning or 
end, and one would be misguided to attempt to find one.  Merleau-Ponty phrases 
the question as to when a situation (or anything else perceived) begins or 
ends in the following way:
 
	Already a 'figure' on a 'background' contains, as we have seen, 
	much more than the qualities presented at a given  time.  It has 
	an 'outline,' which does not 'belong' to the background and which 
	'stands out' from it; it is 'stable' and offers a 'compact' area 
	of color, the background on the other hand having no bounds, being 
	of indefinite colouring and 'running on' under the figure.(9)
 
The problem thus becomes, an issue of where things begin and end (as well as 
an issue of where things begin or end).  Evidently, according to 
Merleau-Ponty, it is impossible for human beings to know this; one cannot 
locate the beginning, end, or any other individual or isolated point in this 
given "situation." This is due to the fact that one cannot separate the 
"elements," or parts, of a situation; a situation is not "reducible" to its 
apparent "parts."(10).  Merleau-Ponty further writes that "[a]quisition 
[through perception] must be accepted as an irreducible phenomenon"(11), and 
that "[e]xistence always carries forward its past, whether it be by accepting 
or disclaiming it."(12)
 
	The last two quotations above (11 and 12) lead into the next aspect of 
what Merleau-Ponty means by "situation," namely that they are reliant (or, 
internally related) to prior "situations."  Temporally, what "follows" is 
dependent on what "precedes."  This is what Merleau-Ponty means in asserting 
that "[e]xistence always carries forward its past, whether by accepting or 
disclaiming it."(13)  In either accepting or disclaiming the past, one's 
present is in some way (either, in this case, positively or negatively) being 
defined by the past by reacting to it; the options of the present are given by 
the past.  Everything that leads into an event (i. e. its past), therefore, 
results in what that present will be (but not in a deterministic sense). The 
possibilities for the present are narrowed by the past.
 
	Intrical to this notion of carrying the past forward is the fact that, 
according to Merleau-Ponty, human beings are responsible for the "creation" 
(or, as Jean-Paul Sartre would say, "scissipation," adapted from the original 
"scissiparity" used by Sartre in Being and Nothingness)of these events in that 
they come into being through perception.  As Merleau-Ponty further declares 
(in this saliently rich section of his chapter on the "cogito"),
 
	[w]e sever our existence from the past itself, and allow it to 
	pick up only those threads of the past which are present.  But 
	how are these threads to be recognized as threads of the past 
	unless we enjoy in some other way a direct opening upon the past?  
	Acquisition must be accepted as an irreducible phenomenon.  What 
	we have experienced is, and remains, permanently ours; and in 
	old age a man is still in contact with his youth.  Every present 
	as it arises is driven into time like a wedge and stakes its 
	claim to eternity.(14)
 
Human beings attempt to separate themselves from the past (specifically, 
*their* pasts, for a human being can only have his own past; a general, 
universal "Past," according to the phenomenology propagated by Merleau-Ponty, 
is impossible), but this is a direct result of the nature of their pasts, and 
as a result, human beings are influenced by their pasts; they "carr[y] forward 
[their] past[s]."(15)  This is how the past becomes a part of the present.
 
	The consequence of this intimate relationship between the past and the 
present is that everything that leads up to a given "event" ("event," here, 
can be considered either in the conventional sense or as used by 
Merleau-Ponty) necessarily becomes a part of that event.  Thus, if one wanted 
to recreate a given "event," one would have to be able to recreate the past 
which lead up to the event.  This becomes important later, for it has a direct 
impact on the possibility of recreating scientific experiments.  Since events 
do not stand alone (i. e. since events are not discrete, or atomistic), 
recreating them becomes impossible, for one would have to recreate the events 
entire past in order to recreate the event.  This becomes impossible in the 
following way.  The occurrence of "Event 1" will be accepted as given.  This 
"Event 1" will be the term used to indicate an initial scientific discovery.  
In order to verify this discovery, "Event 2" is planned and executed, "Event 
2" intended to be a *recreation* of "Event 1."  This, though, is impossible, 
for part of what led to "Event 2" is the aspect of its past called "Event 1."  
What resulted in the planning and execution of "Event 2" is a reaction to its 
past, a reaction which seeks to "accept or disclaim it."(16)
 
	The problem described above can manifest itself in two ways; thus 
another explanation of what has been presented is necessary.  First, one takes 
as given the occurrence of "Event 1."  If the person who performed the 
experiment represented by the term "Event 1," then "Event 1" undoubtedly 
becomes a part of his past.  The consequence is that, regardless of how much 
or in what way he may try to do so, the person who responsible for executing 
"Event 1" cannot separate this event from himself; it is a part of his 
past.(17) This being the case, the person who performed the experiment cannot 
intentionally "delete" it from his memory; it is there permanently, and even 
if "Event 1" is forgotten, the influences of having participated in that event 
will remain with the person who did execute it.  Thus, the person who 
performed "Event 1" cannot reproduce the particular experiment called "Event 
1" because this particular scientist has changed since he initially performed 
the experiment.  When he first performed "Event 1," he had, for example, no 
prior knowledge of the outcome of the experiment.(18)  In trying to recreate 
(or, reproduce) the experiment, the scientist would have to recreate 
everything that contributed to "Event 1," including his ignorance of what 
would later constitute "Event 1."  Essentially, the scientist, in order to 
reproduce "Event 1" would have to do exactly what led to "Event 1" without the 
intention to recreate.  But, since the intention to recreate is part of the 
reason for attempting to reproduce "Event 1," it is evident that such a demand 
(intending to recreate "Event 1" while not intending to do so) is impossible, 
for one seeks both "A" and "- A."  A contradiction results, and one an proceed 
no further.  Phenomenology's approach to science, at this point, crumbles; 
Merleau-Ponty's philosophical system cannot support the science on which it 
relies.(19)
 
	The other problem involved in reproducing an experiment, as part of a 
particular situation (given Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological framework) 
involves perception and subjectivity.(20)  According to Merleau-Ponty, "I will 
never know how you see red."(21)  This quote may at first seem out of place, 
but it is essential to the second aspect of the impossibility of 
reproducibility given Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological framework.  What 
Merleau-Ponty means in writing that "I will never know how you see red,"(22) 
is that one can not know the other as "subject;" one can only know the other 
as "object."  (The "subject" is the thinking/ perceiving/ conscious being , 
and the "object" is what is perceived by this conscious being.)  Essentially, 
I cannot exactly reproduce another person's perceptions according to 
Merleau-Ponty; I cannot see exactly what the person right next to me, looking 
at the same thing at the same time, can see.  Being two different conscious 
beings (and since Merleau-Ponty states that "all consciousness is 
perceptual"(23)), we necessarily have two different approaches to our 
respective "worlds" (or, we have two different perspectives from which we 
perceive our worlds).  If this is true (i. e. if Merleau-Ponty is correct), 
then this two has significant implications for science, especially in regards 
to the repeatability of experiments.  The following example will be helpful.
 
	Assume a laboratory in which two scientists ("A" and "B") work.  
Scientist A made a discovery, one day, while toiling in his part of the 
laboratory.  Being conscientious (and adhering to proper procedure), scientist 
A wanted to be sure that his discovery was not a fluke; he sought to verify 
his findings.  Consequently, he approached his colleague, scientist B, and he 
asked scientist B to reproduce the experiment, with the hopes that scientist B 
would come to the same conclusion, thus verifying the discovery.(24)  
Therefore, scientist B recreated the experiment and verified the discovery of 
scientist A. This does not seem unusual, for it is roughly how science 
progresses.  Yet, given the philosophical system to which Merleau-Ponty 
adheres, scientist B did not (and could not have) verified the findings for 
scientist A.  As two different conscious beings, they had to have had two 
different perceptions.  Thus, the situations were different, and the 
reproduction by scientist B cannot actually be considered a reproduction of 
the experiment, for the original experiment was perceived by scientist A and 
nobody else.
 
	There is another aspect to the problems (phenomenologically) with 
scientist B's supposed reproduction of the experiment performed by scientist 
A.  In reproducing the experiment, scientist B entered into the endeavor with 
expectations (or, *intentions*) very similar to those which scientist A would 
have had if he had decided to reproduce the experiment himself.  Although 
scientist B was not present during the initial execution of the experiment, he 
evidently acquired information regarding the experiment (probably from 
scientist A), which means that he does have some memory of an experience 
related to the experiment (though it is not a direct experience of the 
experiment itself).  This information does, nonetheless, make it impossible to 
recreate the experiment for the same reasons that it would make a recreation 
by scientist A impossible (discussed in detail above).  Scientist B, going 
into the "situation" would have intentions and experiences which were not 
present when the first experiment was executed.  Thus, the recreatability of 
experiments for the purposes of verification (or, evidently, for any other 
purposes) is simply not possible, leaving a significant tension between 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology and the progression of science as human beings 
typically understand it.
 
	The result of the problems detailed above is that human beings are 
left with a choice, a difficult and momentous choice.  One must choose between 
phenomenology (in this case, as it is described by Merleau-Ponty) and science 
as it is seen to progress.(25)  I stated at the beginning of this article that 
science does progress, despite what Merleau-Ponty asserts about the nature of 
reality.  Human beings can quite easily find evidence to support the stance 
that science does progress; an example of "progression" is the computer at 
which I presently sit.  If science were not capable of progressing, then this 
computer would not be here, and the ideas which I have brought to the 
foreground (in this article) would not exist, for there would have been no 
need for them.  Yet, I am here working, and the ideas which I have presented 
are important.  This is a direct result of the fact that science does 
progress.  Consequently, phenomenologists should reconsider their position, 
for it is not only counter-intuitive but it collapses under its own weight 
(upon deeper examination).
 
	This notion that phenomenology is shown to collapse warrants further 
explanation, not simply a casual mention.  I wrote above that phenomenology is 
in conflict with science "as it is seen to progress." Instead of using "seen," 
one could just as easily use "perceived":  "as it [science] is *perceived* to 
progress." The fact that this progression is seen (or, "perceived") implies 
that there must be somebody to perceive this progression.  This is consistent 
both with what I wrote and with what Merleau-Ponty asserts throughout his 
writings.  The result is that another contradiction arises in Merleau-Ponty's 
"camp."  Human beings, given Merleau-Ponty's philosophical position, perceive 
both the "problem" (by which I mean Merleau- Ponty's brand of phenomenology) 
and the "alternative" (by which I mean the fact that Merleau-Ponty's stance is 
incorrect because it is not consistent with what human beings perceive).  The 
result is that, even given a phenomenological framework, Merleau-Ponty's 
position leads to contradiction.
 
	It is evident that science does progress, something upon which 
Merleau-Ponty relies.  Even if two different "conscious beings" perceive the 
"same" thing "differently," there is some common ground between these two 
interpretations, and it does extend beyond the boundaries of what the 
phenomenologists call "facticity," "facticity" being certain "brute facts" of 
existence.  They are beyond interpretation, for they are what is interpreted 
in the act of perception.  Thus, attempting to define what is "factical" is 
impossible, for any attempted definition would be an interpretation, and an 
interpretation of what is "factical" is not a definition of what itself is 
"factical."(26)  Situations, though, are not what would be considered 
"factical," for it is implied that an interpretation has already been 
rendered, for a situation, in order to be a situation, must have already been 
perceived and as a result interpreted.  "Facticity," on the other hand, can be 
described as "pre-perceptual" and "pre-interpretive."  Thus, science and 
phenomenology are still irreconcilable.
 
	Even though science and phenomenology seem irreconcilable, one could 
argue that, since different beings interpret the same "factical entities," the 
interpretations are "close enough" to one another to be considered legitimate. 
 An explanation of reality, of the universe as a whole, though, should not 
seek to render an explanation which is merely "close enough," though.  If a 
philosophical system sought to do that, and announced it from the outset, it 
would typically be cast aside.(27)  For this reason, phenomenology as 
presented by Merleau-Ponty cannot be accepted as a viable explanation of 
reality.  It leaves too many holes in "reality," and it does not recognize the 
existence of these holes.
 
	Thus, despite Merleau-Ponty's salient reliance on examples from the 
sciences in the *Phenomenology of Perception* (as well as in his other works), 
his philosophical position does not uphold the sciences; in fact as a 
foundation for the sciences, Merleau-Ponty's philosophical system is destined 
to failure, for it is evident from what has been presented above that the 
version of phenomenology detailed by Merleau-Ponty is not capable of upholding 
the sciences.  Given what Merleau-Ponty presents as his philosophical 
position, the progression of science as it is observed by human beings in 
general becomes impossible.  The result is that what at first seems to be a 
solid philosophical position crumbles when applied to a critical aspect of 
human existence.  In order to keep science and scientific progression as it is 
understood (and understood to work), phenomenology (specifically, later 
phenomenology) must be sacrificed.  The sacrifice is not enormous, though, for 
phenomenology fails in its fundamental task, to explain reality.
 
 
                              Notes
                            _________
 
1.  The internet, of course, serves as a common example of today's 
disappearing of privacy.  One can even find my supposedly unlisted telephone 
number on a "worldwide web directory."  I guess this is what paying my phone 
bill gets me . . .
 
2.  This second issue of certainty is not one of privacy, though.
 
3.  This, at first, seems like a blanket statement which warrants further 
justification, but that is not actually the case.  For, there are certain 
elements which are essential to all notions of scientific progression.  That 
which is critical here (and will receive detailed attention in due time) is 
the necessity of repeatability in regards to experiments.
 
4.  This point needed to be mentioned, for it is important.  In regards to the 
greater argument of this paper, though, it is nothing more than a necessary 
tangent.
 
5.  From this point, unless otherwise specified, "phenomenology" refers 
specifically to that brand of phenomenology to which Merleau-Ponty adhered.
 
6.  Merleau-Ponty, Maurice.  Phenomenology of Perception.  transl. Colin Smith 
(Routledge 1995), p.209.
 
"Sensations [to include the sensation of situations] . . . are then far from 
being reducible to a certain indescribable state or quale; they present 
themselves with a motor physiognomy, and are enveloped in a living 
significance."
 
7.  Merleau-Ponty does not refer specifically to scientific experiments, but 
as examples of "situations," what Merleau-Ponty says about "situations" in 
general applies to them.
 
8.  Merleau-Ponty, Maurice.  "The Sensible World and the World of Expression." 
 Themes from the Lectures at the College de France:  1952-1960.  transl. John 
O'Neill (Northwestern University Press 1970), pp. 3-4.
 
"[T]he meaning of a perceived object when picked out from all others still 
does not stand isolated from the constellation in which it appears."  cf. 
Phenomenology of Perception, p. 67, "To see an object is to have it on the 
fringe of the visual field [italics mine] and be able to concentrate on it, or 
else respond to this summons by actually concentrating upon it."
 
9.  Phenomenology of Perception, p. 13.
 
10.  Phenomenology of Perception, p. 393.
 
11.  Ibid.
 
12.  Ibid.
 
13.  Ibid.
 
14.  Ibid.
 
15.  Ibid.
 
16.  Ibid.
 
17.  Ibid.
 
18.  In fact, he had not yet experienced the event at all.
 
19.  Despite the tension which I am describing as existing between 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology and the way in which science is observed to 
progress, Merleau-Ponty does frequently use examples from the sciences 
(including psychology) in, for example, the Phenomenology of Perception to 
illustrate the points which he attempts to make (an example of this can be 
found in the Phenomenology of Perception, pp.139-42).  Merleau-Ponty does not 
assert (or even seem to believe) that science is impossible (even given his 
philosophical framework), but I, in this article, am demonstrating how science 
cannot progress if Merleau-Ponty is correct.
 
20.  This is only one of the issues regarding the implications which 
subjective perception has on science.  But, in order to maintain the narrow 
focus of this paper, the peripheral issues are not to be dealt with here.
 
21.  Merleau-Ponty, Maurice.  "The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical 
Consequences."  transl. James P. Edie.  The Primacy of Perception 
(Northwestern University Press 1970), p. 17.
 
22.  ibid.
 
23.  "The Primacy of Perception," p. 13.
 
24.  In the context of this article, "reproduce" and "repeat" are meant to be 
equivalent (as well as variations of these terms).
 
25.  One should note that I used the word "seen" in the given sentence.  It 
could just as easily have been "perceived" as opposed to "seen."  "Perceived," 
further, more clearly illustrates that Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological stance 
crumbles.
 
26.  A formal definition of "facticity," as it is used by phenomenologists, 
follows:
 
"C'est cette facticite' qui permet de dire qu'il est, qu'il existe, bien que 
nous ne puissions jamais la re'aliser et que nous la saisissions toujours 'a 
travers le pour-soi."
 
Sartre, Jean-Paul.  L'Etre et le ne'ant.  (Gallimard 1943), p. 113.
 
27.  Pragmatism presents an apparent counterexample to my assertion, but even 
the more "accepted" pragmatists (such as Richard Rorty) have a "grander 
scheme" which governs their pragmatism (whether they admit it or not) which is 
much more than mere pragmatism.
 
Richard Rorty.  Public Lecture at St. Norbert's College (February 1996), in 
conjunction with a question and comment from the audience (asked, namely, by 
myself).