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The Effect of Goedel's Theorem on Natural Laws:
Comments on: "Are Maxwell's Equation's Enough?"
_______________________________________________
Timothy Paul Smith
Department of Physics
University of New Hampshire
Durham, New Hampshire 03824
tps@fermi.unh.edu
(received: September 29, 1994)
A few comments on the effect of Goedel's theorem on such
physical equations as Maxwell's ["Are Maxwell's Equation's Enough?",
Metaphysical Review, August 1994]. When discussing the consistency and
completeness (and related undecidables) of Maxwell's Equations, or any
set of equations in physics, we are walking a thin line between
mathematics and nature. To understand the relevance of Goedel's theorem
on Maxwell's equations we must first understand what they are and what
is their realm of application. I will divided this problem into three
parts: nature, physics and mathematics.
Nature can have no paradoxs. This is perhaps my `self-evident
truth'. However statements such as `self-evident' have too often lead
investigators astray and into trouble (it is self-evident that the earth
is flat, and the speed of light in infinite), so I will examine it,
and try to present some rudimentary evidence. As a corollary, nature
can have no paradox because it is consistent and complete.
Nature can have no paradoxs. A ball in flight can not curve
both right and left simultaneously. When there appears to be a paradox
in physics it is generally caused by our ignorance or our
approximations. A textbook example of a paradox due to our ignorance is
the appearance of a particle being in two places at once in the case of
the quantum mechanics double slit experiment. If we knew nothing of
wavefunctions it appears to be a paradox. With the enlightment of
quantum mechanical wavefunctions the paradox is resolved. A textbook
example of a paradox arising from approximation is provided by the so
called `twins paradox' of relativity. If we ignored the acceleration of
the spacecraft we create for ourselves a paradox. But nature makes no
approximations.
Nature is complete. An inconsistent or incomplete set of
`natural laws' would allow for situations without solutions. Try to
imagine a circumstance where a combination of quarks and/or galaxies can
not evolve in time because there are no rules for their evolution.
Excluding perhaps the initial "Big Bang" and final "Big Crunch" nature
always proceeds in time. This does not necessarily imply or require
determinism. Nature's consistency and completeness even allows for such
possibility as the `many worlds' interpretation of quantum mechanics.
By being complete there are no undecidable statements in nature.
The paradox is of great importance in the development of
Goedel's Theorem, as was pointed out by O'Connor. If there was no
possibility of a paradox, there would be no such thing as Goedel's
Theorem. In a very real sense I believe that Goedel's Theorem doesn't
apply to natural laws.
What is physics (or biology or chemistry or any other physical
science)? It is the attempt to map nature into a descriptive system or
language. For example we can map the phenomena called electromagnetism
into the descriptive language of vector calculus. We call the mapping
`Maxwell's Equations'. Since we chose as our language vector calculus we
gain certain advantages such as calculatability, over a different
choice of language, such as English. We also acquire all the
disadvantages of mathematics, such as Goedel's Theorem.
There really is no escaping Goedel's Theorem. In mathematical
systems such as vector calculus we will necessarily have undecidable
statements. These are statements whose truth can not show based upon
the axioms of the systems, the axioms of vector calculus.
Do gauge transformations qualify as undecidables? I do not
believe so. I raise the example of gauges because they demonstrate that
a set of equations may be useful, but not absolute necessary. Without
gauge transformation one can still calculate the same problems that one
calculates with the transformations, it may just be messy. There are
equations consistent with electromagnetism which you can not derive
from Maxwell's equation, which are just not necessary to describe the
natural phenomena.
The question remains is there anything beyond Maxwell's
equations which are necessary to completely describe nature? Let us
return to the problem of mapping electromagnetism into vector calculus.
If Maxwell's equations are a perfect map of electromagnetism then any
vector calculus additions which Goedel's theorem tells us exist are not
necessary for the description of nature.
How could one test for consistent and completeness in Maxwell's
equations? I suggest that the best we can do is construct a `model' as
describe by O'Connor. The best model of Maxwell's equations is a set of
physical phenomena known as electromagnetism. Now this many seams like
cyclic logic. Rather, it is just a consistence check ( if
electromagnetism is equivalent to Maxwell's equations, then Maxwell's
equations are equivalent to electromagnetism). It leads us to looking
for the necessary undecidables of Maxwell's equations in the laboratory.
***
This was not the conclusion which I had hoped for, although
perhaps it is what one should have expected. Still, there are two
things to note. Experimental verification is always limited to the
range of the experiment. Outside that range one can never know in an
absolute sense if Maxwell's equations are applicable. The other point
is that experimental evidence with is not consistent with Maxwell's
equations may mean that they are additional undecidables, perhaps even
an infinite number. It many also mean that the language we have chosen,
ie. vector calculus, is not the best choice for describing
electromagnetism.
In the realm which Maxwell's equations are generally applied
they have stood the test of time and experiment remarkedly unscathed.
They withstood, and in fact help foster the relativistic revolution. In
quantum mechanics Maxwell's equations have in some since been
incorporated into Quantum Electrodynamics (QED).
***
Up to this point I have treated Maxwell's equations as obtained
from experimental results. Historically I believe this is in fact where
Maxwell obtained them. What may be of more interest to the
metaphysicist is when you consider Maxwell's equations as a derived
result, starting from some metaphysical axioms. If I start with what?
Conservation of charge? Three spatial and one temporal dimension? The
universality and invariance of the `laws of nature' (and physics) in
all references frames? The invariance of the speed of light?
This raises the question does Goedel's theorem apply to
metaphysical systems? Can a valid metaphysical system support a paradox?
I will confess that I do not know.
Timothy Paul Smith
Durham, New Hampshire
September 29, 1994
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