Merleau-Ponty and Nietzsche: Perspectivism in Perception

        ________________________________________________________



                        Mark McCreary

                        Southern Methodist University School of Law

                        mmccrear@post.cis.smu.edu



                        (received: August 15, 1995)

			(revised: September 18, 1995)

             (first printed - Vol. 2, No. 3 - October 1995)





	The dilemma of the way in which the individual perceives the world 

has been one of the many perplexing questions of philosophy.  Is there 

an *a priori* understanding that is granted with birth?  Or do culture, 

linguistics, environment, social structures, economics, etc. influence 

how the individual perceives?  Is the world in which one perceives a 

given, formed, and defined, the same for all?  Are there many ways to 

perceive the world and environment, and how does the role of the body 

fit into it?

     Friedrich Nietzsche and Maurice Merleau-Ponty both tackled these 

questions in their respective philosophies.  They clearly defined the 

role of the body, the differences of the world for each individual, the 

meaning of things in the world, the role of sedimentation and 

perspectivism, and the process by which the individual perceives.  

Examination of how each does this reveals that both advocated 

understanding of the world through perspectivism in perception.

     Nietzsche believes that society is entrenched in a dogmatic 

commitment to the search for a universal, right way to live.  This quest 

is not worthwhile, impossible, and dangerous.  By looking closely at 

Nietzsche's view of the body, the 'world,' the thing-in-itself, 

perspectivism, and perception, the truth of this statement becomes 

clear.

     Ever since Descartes made the claim that the mind and the body 

were separate, philosophers have been trying to glue them back together. 

This is crucial for Nietzsche, who not only dismisses this Cartesian 

legacy, but all philosophical legacies (based on this dogmatic 

approach).  Nietzsche places the self in the body and the body in the 

world; not only does the body belong to the 'self' of the individual, 

the body is the 'self' of the individual.  As Joyce Eckblad stated, "For 

Nietzsche, self and body encompass the same instinctual motives; the 

self is the body.  The degree to which we are our bodies demarcates the 

level of acceptance which we exhibit toward the state of 

being-in-the-world" [Eckblad, 275].  The body is the means by which 

humans have contact, understanding, and influence over the world.  The 

body belongs to the individual and is the gateway to the world for the 

individual.

     Eckblad further illustrates this point by showing the 

phenomenological side of Nietzsche.  The body is the means by which one 

comes to know, identify, and affirm the world; this is the lived body 

for Nietzsche:  "If this is the case, then obviously, the individual is 

not known through the body for another, the narcissistic body, but 

through the lived body" [Eckblad, 275].  The lived body creates for the 

individual a means to the world, and "the denial of the body is 

equivalent to a rejection of earthly, i.e., bodily existence" [Eckblad, 

275].  With the importance and role of the body for Nietzsche 

established, the meaning of 'world' plays another significant role.

     Before diving into the 'world,' which Nietzsche holds as evident, 

one must realize the importance of breaking with the dogmatic tradition. 

In most past philosophies and religions there has been a direct effort 

to define the world as a thing-in-itself:  a universal, existing, 

perspective-independent thing.  Nietzsche completely abhorred this view; 

the 'world' and the individual form a continuum that cannot be set 

apart.  Such a definition would require an interpretation, and an 

interpretation is simply nothing more than a perspective holding true 

only for the individual possessing the perspective.  Alexander Nehamas 

is quick to point this out by claiming that the 'real world' of the 

dogmatist is not the 'the actual' world one lives in.  "It shows that 

the orderly, apparently purposeful world within which we live is a 

creation we have placed between ourselves and the real world, which 

pursues its course without any regard for our views, our values, and our 

desires" [Nehamas, 43].  Nietzsche's break with the dogmatic tradition 

is apparent through that which results:  the notion that there is no 

perspective-independent world, but, rather, a world that is 

perspective-independent.  In addition, Nietzsche specifically does not 

allow for a true world in *The Will to Power*:  "The antithesis of the 

apparent world and the true world is reduced to the antithesis 'world' 

and 'nothing'" [WP, 567].   This passage reinforces the conclusion by 

Nehamas that there cannot be defined a real, universal world to apply to 

all humans uniformly.

     Even though it is not possible to defend a ready-made world, the 

world which  humans inhabit is not such a vastly different world.  The 

individual, perspectival worlds are different "only in degrees and [in] 

subtleties of gradation" [BGE, 24].  The world is essentially the same 

framework upon which humans give meaning, but the ordering and 

interpretations of each individual creates such a radical array of 

worlds that there is no 'real' world.  The differing worlds only differ 

by subtle differences in interpretation.

     Finally, Nietzsche shows how, as experiencers, doers, in the 

world, individuals create our own world: "We have arranged for ourselves 

a world in which we can live - by positing bodies, lines, planes, causes 

and effects, motion and rest, form and content; without these articles 

of faith nobody could endure life" [GS, 121].  It is the world that 

individuals create, that they give meaning to and interpret, that 

separates other's worlds from them.  This move is also a break with the 

dogmatic approach to the world as being-for-all at once as a universal 

or form.  But what about things-in-the-world?  Is there an existing 

thing-in-itself as dogmatic tradition holds?

     If there was such a thing-in-itself, then each individual would 

not find a unique position in the world.  The world would be 

inaccessible to the individual.  A thing in-itself would require 

*a priori* meaning in the object, upon which one would give personal, 

experienced meaning, i.e. - the world.  Clearly, though, the world does 

not exist in-itself; no objects exist in-themselves [WP, 560]. 

     If one was to assume that there is a thing-in-itself, then surely 

one can remove an object and have the meaning of all other objects 

remain intact.  Unfortunately, without the wheel, the meaning of the 

bicycle fails, and the bicycle reveals that it has no inherent meaning 

without the meanings that are given to it by the sum of its parts.  "The 

'thing-in-itself' is nonsensical.  If I remove all the relationships, 

all the 'properties,' all the 'activities' of a thing, the thing does 

not remain over" [WP, 558].  Also, "The properties of a thing are 

effects on other 'things':  if one removes other 'things,' then a thing 

has no properties, i.e., there is no thing without other things, i.e., 

there is no 'thing-in-itself'" [WP, 557].  Finally, "In the actual 

world, in which everything is bound to and conditioned by everything 

else, to condemn and think away anything means to condemn and think away 

everything" [WP, 584].  There cannot exist a thing without other things, 

without persons, therefore there are no 'things-in-themselves.'

     Now that there is a foundation consisting of the vehicle used for 

experience, the body, the world which each individual inhabits, and the 

things that are given meaning by the individual, an account of 

perspectivism will show how such a system develops for the individual in 

order to perceive and interpret.

     As Nietzsche's quote preceding this essay demonstrated, humans 

live through a body-schema that is fabricated by themselves vis-?vis 

experiences and interpretations.  While the individual experiences there 

is a growing sedimentation of reference, interpretation, and conclusion 

from which one takes all future meaning.  It is impossible to experience 

without referring back to this pool, and this field dictates the manner 

in which individuals come to know and experience the world.  Quite 

simply, things are how individuals perceive them through their own 

perspective:  "Everything which coexists in time and space has but a 

relative existence...Each thing exists through and for another one like 

it, which is to say through and for an equally relative one...The whole 

nature of reality lies wholly in its acts and...for it there is no other 

sort of being" [PTG, 5].  As stated before, there is no thing-in-itself; 

rather, the thing exists by means of  its relationship to other things; 

that definition is determined and concluded by reference to the past 

experiences, culture, linguistics, biological aspects, etc., that make 

up the schema.

     The world in which one resides is perspective-dependent.  

Nietzsche, while speaking about science, explains how the world one 

experiences is created and manipulated by the individual:  "That the 

only justifiable interpretation of the world should be one in which  you 

are justified because one can continue to work and do research 

scientifically in *your* sense (you really mean mechanistically?) - an 

interpretation that permits counting, calculating, weighing, seeing, and 

touching, and nothing more - that is a crudity and naivet, assuming 

that it is not a mental illness, an idiocy" [GS, 373].  Nietzsche 

explains how the world in which one resides and operates is created and 

manipulated by perspective.  This gives a distinct meaning to each 

individual world, making the perspective that one has the means of 

interpreting events and occurrences in their world.  Without that 

meaning given by perspectivism, there would not be a world [WP, 567].

     The impact of this idea is brought to light by one of Nietzsche's 

most famous aphorisms:  "No, facts is precisely what there is not, only 

interpretations" [WP, 481].  With this Nietzsche not only proves the 

necessity of a perspectival world, but also denounces the philosophical, 

dogmatic tradition of the past:  "*What, then, is regressive in the 

philosopher?* - That he teaches that *his* qualities are the necessary and 

sole qualities for the attainment of the 'highest good' (e.g., dialectic 

with Plato).  That he orders men of all kinds *gradatim* up to *his* type 

as the highest" [WP, 446].

     The means by which an individual perceives includes the aspects 

which were just discussed.  By accessing the experience through the 

body, creating one's own world, and interpreting through reference to 

perspective, the individual's perception is expounded.  The first 

premise to be established is that individuals are not living in the 

'real' world, but rather they are composing the world which they 

experience.  "The contrast between this real truth of nature and the lie 

of culture that poses as if it were the only reality is similar to that 

between the eternal core of things, the thing-in-itself, and the whole 

world of appearances" [BT, 8].  One's perception is based upon what one 

believes the world to be through their sedimented perspective.  As said 

before, the human being is not designed for pure knowledge [WP, 496], so 

perspectives are concluded through their own perception.

     As a general premise of perspectivism, humans perceive events and 

interpretations on a continuum which dictates how things are perceived.  

"*Cause and effect*. - 'Explanation' is what we call it, but it is 

'description' that distinguishes us from older stages of knowledge and 

science.  Our descriptions are better - we do not explain any more than 

our predecessors.  We have uncovered a manifold one-after-another where 

the naive man and inquirer of older cultures saw only two separate 

things" [GS, 112].  For Nietzsche, the fact that individuals are able to 

perceive on a continuum allows for better account:  "We separate 

ourselves, the doers, from the deed, and we make use of this pattern 

everywhere - we seek a doer for every event.  What is it we have done?  

We have misunderstood the feeling of strength, tension, resistance, a 

muscular feeling that is already the beginning of the act, as the 

cause...A necessary sequence of states does not imply a causal 

relationship between them...If I think of the muscle apart from its 

'effects,' I negate it...A 'thing' is the sum of its effects [WP, 551].

     Another premise of perspectivism necessary to understand 

perception is that nothing is entirely knowable.  The perspectival 

outlook focuses on what is of interest to it.  The fact remains, thus, 

that every experience is constructed from previous experiences which act 

as interpreters of future events.  The perspective that is gained is 

treated as the truth for the individual and is adhered to as the meaning 

of the world; thus, the individual's perception creates truth in the 

perspectival world which he or she inhabits.  "Hitherto one has 

generally trusted one's concepts as if they were a wonderful dowry from 

some sort of wonderland:  but they are, after all, the inheritance from 

our most remote, most foolish as well as most intelligent ancestors" 

[WP, 409].  Perception arises from the framework created by implications 

of ancestors as well as the experiences of each individual.

     Now that the means of perception are established, one may ask, 

"What do Nietzsche's beliefs about perception mean to perception?"  

First, the lived body experiencing the world places all perceptions on a 

background that consists of:  culture, linguistics, environment, 

biological characteristics, and community structures.  These all 

influence the way that the individual perceives and interprets. All 

perception is determined by the baggage of past experiences of the 

individual.  There is no pure or perspective-free view of 'anything.'  

While one may enjoy a song on the radio because it reminds the 

individual of a love, another may become depressed because it reminds 

that individual of the death of a love; the interpretation of every 

single event is ascertained by the background which the individual 

places it upon.  Individuals are able to communicate through commonality 

of elements framing their views, but they never have complete 

communication between each other.  Such an understanding of the other 

would compromise the integrity of perspectivism.

     Now that Nietzsche's perspectivism and its role in perception has 

been established, an analysis of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's view is 

necessary for the reader to obtain a firm grasp of the material.

     Merleau-Ponty advocates the belief that the lived experience of 

the individual is a reduction of the phenomenon of the world referring 

structures.  He argues that the body acts as the introduction of the 

self to the world, interpreted through sedimented perspectives acquired 

through  the individual's life.  By looking at how Merleau-Ponty views 

the body, the world, the thing-in-itself, perspectivism, and perception, 

one can begin to see the basis by which he reduces experience to a 

phenomenological account.

     Joseph Kockelmans found that for Merleau-Ponty the body is the 

means to project the self into and define the world of experience.  "As 

Merleau-Ponty sees it, the human body is not a thing, but a means in 

order to manifest meaning, to make this meaning be, to project and 

communicate that meaning.  The human body is in the world as our heart 

is in our body:  it keeps the visible spectacle continuously alive; it 

breathes life into the world and nourishes it from the inside; and 

together with the world it constitutes one single system" [Kockelmans, 

278].  The body is the window to experience for the self.  There is no 

Cartesian dualism for Merleau-Ponty, but rather the self is the body and 

the body is the self; they are inseparable and co-dependent [PP, 198].

     With the body and the self inseparable, the only way in which one 

can experience the world is through the body:  "I cannot understand the 

function of the living body except by enacting it myself, and except in 

so far as I am a body which rises towards the world" [PP, 75].  The body 

is the necessary apparatus for experiencing the world.  At the same 

time, the object  is the reply to the body which perceives it.  

Merleau-Ponty puts the role of the body as the objectifier, identifier, 

and confirmer of the object with the following comment:  "The synthesis 

of the object is here effected, then, through the synthesis of one's own 

body, it is the reply or correlative to it, and it is literally the same 

thing to perceive one single marble, and to use two fingers as one 

single organ" [PP, 205].  Gary Madison makes this point more clearly by 

stating, "The lived, phenomenal body must therefore not be thought of as 

an object in itself, but as the way a subject is *present* in the world 

and is aware of it" [Madison, 23].

     Finally, in reference to the body, Joseph Kockelmans gives a 

concrete explanation of Merleau-Ponty's comment in *Phenomenology of 

Perception*, p. 293, by explaining that the body places the individual in 

the natural world:  "In the constitution of this natural world my body 

plays an important role.  For it is my body which places me in a human 

world by projecting me first into a natural world which can always be 

discerned as underlying other forms of world, just as the canvas 

underlies the picture" [Kockelmans, 305].  The body is the catalyst 

between the realm of the self and the projection of the self into the 

world.  A look at what the world is for Merleau-Ponty will make this 

statement all the more crucial.

     There does not exist a perspective-independent world, only a 

'nature' of the world.  Also, there is no way in which the individual 

can come to know the world except through the body:  "We started off 

from a world in itself which acted upon our eyes so as to cause us to 

see it, and now we have consciousness of or thought about the world, but 

the nature of this world remains unchanged:  it is still defined by the 

absolute mutual exteriority of its parts, and is merely duplicated 

throughout its extent by a thought which sustains it" [PP, 39].  The 

body brings the world into contact with the self.

     The world is defined through relations that it has with the 

subject.  Gary Madison notes that "he [Merleau-Ponty] wants to define 

the world exclusively in terms of its *relation to the subject*" [Madison, 

33], which is derived from the claim that "the world as we have tried to 

show it, as standing on the horizon of our life as the primordial unity 

of all our experiences, and one goal of all our projects, is no longer 

the visible unfolding of a constituting Thought, not a chance 

conglomeration of parts, nor, of course, the working of a controlling 

Thought on an indifferent matter, but the native abode of all 

rationality" [PP, 430].

     Since the world is defined through its relations with the 

individual, the relations of the individual to the world make possible 

the individual's perspective:



          I cannot conceive the world as a sum of things, nor 

     time as a sum of instantaneous 'present moments', since 

     each thing can offer itself in its full determinacy only 

     if other things recede into the vagueness of the remote 

     distance, and each present can take on its reality only 

     by excluding the simultaneous presence of earlier and 

     later presents, and since thus a sum of things or of 

     presents makes nonsense.  Things and instants can link 

     up with each other to form a world only through the medium 

     of that ambiguous being known as a subjectivity, and can 

     become present to each other only from a certain point of 

     view and in intention.  [PP, 333]



The world is the experience of the outside-itself by the self, but to 

experience the outside the self must refer to its sedimented perspective 

while perceiving outside itself.

     The world which one perceives is the individual's own world, and 

the world which another individual perceives is never the same world as 

the first individual perceives.  "WE SEE THINGS THEMSELVES, the world is 

what we see:  formulae of this kind express a faith common to the 

natural man and the philosopher - the moment he opens his eyes; they 

refer to a deep-seated set of mute 'opinions' implicated in our lives" 

[VI, 3].  The world for the individual is simply how the individual 

perceives it, and through being possessed by a unique perspective, each 

person is the only one able to come to an understanding of this world.

     Finally, while the individual experiences a world that is unique 

to them, there does exist a general nature of the world.  Also, by 

experiencing the same language, culture, biological characteristic, 

etc., each individual has a grounding that is similar and universal.  

This phenomenological term is called *Fundierung*:



          The relation of reason to fact, or eternity to time, 

     like that of reflection to the unreflective, of thought to 

     language or of thought to perception is this two-way 

     relationship that phenomenology has called Fundierung:  

     the founding term, or originator - time, the unreflective, 

     the fact, language, perception - is primary in the sense 

     that the originated is presented as a determinate or explicit 

     form of the originator, which prevents the latter from 

     reabsorbing the former, and yet the originator is not primary 

     in the empiricist sense and the originated is not simply 

     derived from it, since it is through the originated that 

     the originator is made manifest.  [PP, 394]



This is the basis for Merleau-Ponty to hold that the world which each 

individual body experiences is similar, but the perspective that each 

self has on the world is unique.  This still does not give the world an 

in-itself meaning, but, rather, it gives it an in-itself-for-others 

meaning.

     Knowing now how the body operates in the world, it is important to 

see how objects exist in the world in relation to the self.  

Merleau-Ponty will have difficulty answering this problem.  He will 

begin by claiming that there must be a denial of a world existing 

in-itself, and give the world a meaning that is in-itself-for-us.  Gary 

Madison points this out by saying, "He [Merleau-Ponty] thereby discovers 

that the world of our experiences, the perceived or phenomenal world - 

the only world of which we in fact have any experience and of which we 

can therefore speak - is a world which cannot be in itself, indifferent 

to our relation to it, since its dimensions and structures exist only as 

the correlatives of the lived body" [Madison, 34].  In fact, 

Merleau-Ponty will note that the world free of perspectives and existing 

in-itself would cease to exist [PP, 331-2].  The reason for this seems 

to be that there no perspectival access to support its existence.  There 

would not be a proof that it was existing if there was no means to 

confirm its existence.

     The object as in-itself-for-us is reiterated by Merleau-Ponty:  

"It is not even true that the one (the subject, for instance) gives 

meaning to the other (the perceived thing).  One must say that in the 

'natural interaction' between subject and thing a meaning becomes 

constituted, comes into being which is neither in the manner of the 

in-itself not in the manner of the for-itself.  That in every act of 

sensation no pure for-itself manifests itself is evident from the fact 

that the subject as it manifests itself on that level is still a 

'general' and anonymous subject" [Kockelmans, 279].  This  addresses the 

major unanswered question in the *Phenomenology of Perception*.

     Merleau-Ponty spells out the problem of modality:  "The problem of 

the existential modality of the social is here at one with all problems 

of transcendence.  Whether we are concerned with my body, the natural 

world, the past, birth or death, the question is always how can I be 

open to phenomena which transcend me, and which nevertheless exist only 

to the extent that I take them up and live them; *how the presence to 

myself (Urpr:asenz) which establishes my own limits and conditions every 

alien presence is at the same time depresesentation (Entgegenw:artigung)

and throws me outside myself*" [PP, 363].  It seems that he ultimately 

doesn't give a concrete meaning to things as they exist independent of 

perspective, but rather he finds that they are given their meaning by 

the perspective that is applied by the individual.  Essentially, a thing 

cannot exist in-itself, but it exists in-in-itself-for-others.  This 

question of modality is one that Merleau-Ponty will continue to struggle 

with.

     One now knows how Merleau-Ponty places the body, the world, and 

objects, then creates a system in which all experiences are stored, 

analyzed, and concluded.  Perspectivism is the view that all that one 

encounters is conditioned by sedimented background which selects what is 

useful meaning for the individual.  Merleau-Ponty explains, "Our body, 

to the extent that it moves itself about, that is, to the extent that it 

is inseparable from a view of the world and is that view itself brought 

into existence, is the condition of possibility, not only of the 

geometrical synthesis, but all expressive operations and all acquired 

views which constitute the cultural world" [PP, 388].  The lived world 

is experienced through perspective; past experiences, and the effect 

that they have upon the individual, makes up the milieu.  "But the lived 

body moves in a world of privileged perspectives organized around the 

projects of that body and the given significance of its milieu" 

[Schenck, 309].

     Merleau-Ponty constructs what he calls the 'intentional arc' to 

explain this milieu.  The 'intentional arc' is essentially the 

connection of being and world through the mixture of all of the 

cultural, linguistic, physical, desirable, interesting, etc. dimensions 

of perspectivism.  The events which the individual experiences, which 

exerts an influence over the individual, and determines further 

interpretation and perception, creates the sedimentation from which the 

intentional arc proceeds.  In speaking about sexuality, Merleau-Ponty 

comments, "We discover both that sexual life is one more form of 

original intentionality, and also bring to view the vital origins of 

perception, motility and representation by basing all these 'processes' 

on an 'intentional arc' which gives way in the patient, and which, in 

the normal subject, endows experience with its degree of vitality and 

fruitfulness" [PP, 157].  Thus, the 'intentional arc' serves as the 

reference point by which  experiences and interpretations is possible.

     Knowing how the body and the world interact through perception one 

can begin to move into seeing how one perceives events.  Joyce Eckblad 

notes that "perception is essentially an attitude which evolves from a 

particular and unique lifestyle.  It is the recognition not only of the 

constituents of experience, but the mood which surrounds and permeates 

events" [Eckblad, 279].

     The way in which the individual perceives is of great importance 

for Merleau-Ponty.  He is adamant in insisting that all images emerge 

out of a background, a perspective, that determines how they will be 

viewed.  Perception is always the selection  of a figure from a 

background.  There exists a dot on the background which exists as part 

of the whole.  Whenever individuals focus on one thing, they leave out 

many things that are not included in our view, resulting in an 

incomplete perception of the whole.  Merleau-Ponty describes the world 

as "a vast individual from which my own experiences are taken, and which 

persists on the horizon of my life as the distant roar of a great city 

provides the background to everything we do in it" [PP, 328].  He 

elaborates:  "ONCE introduced, the notion of sensation distorts any 

analysis of perception.  Already a 'figure' on a 'background' contains, 

as has been seen, much more that the qualities presented at a given 

time.  It has an 'outline', which does not 'belong' to the background 

and which 'stands out' from it; it is 'stable' and offers a 'compact' 

area of colour, the background on the other hand having no bounds, being 

of infinite colouring and 'running on' under the figure" [PP, 13].  This 

backgrounding is essential in understanding how one perceives.  The 

perception is never a pure representation of the thing, but rather it is 

the interpretation which has been delivered by the individual's 

perspective.

     Joseph Kockelmans comments on Merleau-Ponty's notion of the space 

in which the individual operates.  The existence of the object in space 

is determined by perspectivism, otherwise "our perception would contain 

no outlines, no figures, no backgrounds, no objects either, and it 

would, consequently, be a perception of nothing, or rather no perception 

at all, if the subject of perception were not this gaze which has a 

grasp on those things only insofar as they have a certain orientation in 

space were a contingent characteristic of the thing.  This orientation 

is the means by which I recognize a thing for what it is and by which I 

am conscious of it as an object" [Kockelmans, 288-9]++.  Without this 

background there would not be a systemic, flowing, interwoven system of 

individual experience [PP, 250-1].

     The perception that one has of objects, as placed against a 

sedimented background, constitute what will be true for the individual:  

"it is because I have an experience of the real as of the imaginary, the 

problem then becomes one not of asking how critical thought can provide 

for itself secondary equivalents of this distinction, but of making 

explicit our primordial knowledge of the 'real', of describing our 

perception of the world as that upon which our idea of truth is forever 

based" [PP, xvi].  This not to imply that what the individual believes 

to be true is 'true,' but that how the individual judges truth and 

falsity for themselves is based upon the sedimented interpretations of 

experience which are true for the individual.

     Finally, Merleau-Ponty establishes the idea that it is not 

possible for the true nature of a thing to exist by arguing:  "We have 

said that this 'perspectivism' of perception is not an indifferent fact, 

since without it the two subjects would not be aware of perceiving an 

existent cube subsisting beyond the sensible contents.  If all the sides 

of the cube could be known at once, I would no longer be dealing with a 

thing which offers itself for inspection little by little, but with an 

idea which my mind would truly possess" [SB, 212].  Thus not only does 

an in-itself not exist, but it is also impossible to have exact 

perspectives since two individuals cannot have knowledge of the same 

perspectival, sedimented world.

     Merleau-Ponty sees the body as the means of entering the world.  

The experience which it has is a lived world, which exists for each 

individual.  The world is constituted by the building of a perspectival 

view upon the world, an aperture if you will.  By seeing the world 

through one's own aperture, a person experiences a world that is similar 

to others, but unique to the individual.  This world is perceived by the 

body which takes in what perspectivism allows it to take in.  Perception 

is determined by what is apparent, relevant, and what is sensible to the 

individual's perspective.  The 'intentional arc' creates a basis for 

which the interpretation of events is derived from the background.  The 

perspective of the individual creates a background which all experiences 

are placed against, interpreted by, and then added to.  There is no 

possible way for the individual to get beyond this background and 

attempt to see some sort of 'truth' in their sight, not only because the 

individual is the perspective and the perspective is the individual, but 

because there is no thing-in-itself existing for the individual to see.

     After closely observing how both philosophers see perception as 

perspectival, one can move to on to see the vast similarities between 

the two.

     First, both Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty find that the lived body 

is the self's access to the world.  By moving swiftly away from the 

Cartesian legacy of separating the mind and the body, both place the 

body as the fundamental connection between the world and the self.  As 

Joyce Eckblad noted, "Both Merleau-Ponty and Nietzsche view the 

reduction of the body to physiological terms as a constriction of the 

possibilities of reality" [Eckblad, 277].  Thus, the body is the vehicle 

to the lived world and the means of experiencing it.

     The 'world' is viewed differently by Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty.  

Nietzsche denies the structure of a world which could exist without 

interpretation.  Merleau-Ponty believes that the world has a general 

nature to it, and has an in-itself-for-others existence.  The individual 

perspective defines how the world is for the observer, but the footing 

the individual has in the world is similar for all.  *This is the idea of 

Fundierung*, and it makes a distinct break from the thinking of 

Nietzsche.  Nietzsche finds that each individual constitutes their 

inhabited world, and that world, for the individual, is the actual 

world.  Merleau-Ponty finds it to be the same world, just different by 

the meaning that their perspective gives it.  Nietzsche denies that 

there could ever be a world that existed outside of human perspective, 

for, if such a world existed, then the interpretation of the world would 

be merely another interpretation.  Merleau-Ponty places the world in an 

existence of in-itself-for-others, with perspective and interpretation 

giving meaning to the world individuals experience.

     For Nietzsche, the object in-itself cannot exist.  Exactly in the 

same way that the world cannot exist in-itself independent of human 

perspective placed upon it, all objects in general cannot exist.  There 

is no 'essence' within an object for Nietzsche.  For Nietzsche, if such 

a thing were to exist, it would be both dogmatic and inconceivable to 

the human intellect.  For Merleau-Ponty, all of the past 'truths' for 

the individual would fall through if some independent meaning came from 

an object making it unrecognizable to the independent perspective.  

While an 'understanding' of an object is beyond human grasp, a thing is 

existing in-itself-for-others for the individual.  The way that the 

individual applies a perspective to it gives the object its meaning.  

Still, Merleau-Ponty is reluctant to completely break with the dogmatic 

tradition of assigning some kind of 'essence' to the object prior to its 

encounter with a perspective.

     Both find that a perspective is the means of access to the world.  

 For Nietzsche, perspective serves as the aperture upon the world, where 

one can operate and interpret.  For Merleau-Ponty, perspective is the 

interpretation of the world constituting the milieu in which one lives.  

Perspective is a necessary function of the human intellect in order to 

interpret.  Without such a perspective, an individual would have no 

basis to form opinions, interpretations, or understandings about that 

which is encountered.  Both philosophers, essentially, are identical in 

their thinking on this subject.

     Finally, perception gives meaning to things and events by 

selecting them as useful, etc.  For Nietzsche, perception immediately 

relates back to the individual's perspective and the perspective 

dictates what is perceived.  For Merleau-Ponty, the 'intentional arc' is 

the means to gain interpretation and understanding of the world and the 

things in it.  Both philosophers agree with this thinking.  Each 

philosopher relies on sedimented experience and interpretation to 

confirm, interpret, and value the world in which he operates.

     Both Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty understand perception 

perspectivally.  They hold similar bodies and acts of interpretation, 

yet they ultimately travel away from one another.  The concept of a 

thing-in-itself and a thing-in-itself-for-others are not similar for the 

two philosophers.  Also, the world which humans inhabit are different, 

but not radically different.  Where Nietzsche holds the utmost disdain 

for any dogmatic approach, Merleau-Ponty is entrenched in understanding 

the world in a phenomenal way.  Still, their views on perception and 

perspective prove very similar and are not placed side-by-side often 

enough.



		---------------------------



(++ This is lifted from Merlean-Ponty in *Phenomenology of Perception* 

	p.253.)



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		------------





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