Martin Heidegger and the Phenomenon of Natural Science

          ______________________________________________________



                             David C. Jacobs

                  Department of Philosophy and Religion

                  University of Tennessee at Chattanooga

                         djacobs@cecasun.utc.edu



                        (received: June 12, 1995)

             (first printed - Vol. 2, No. 1 - July 1995)



     Although Martin Heidegger transforms what he had learned as

"phenomenology" from his mentor Edmund Husserl, his

investigations always concern phenomena -- i.e., "that which

shows itself in itself [1]."  The phenomenon with which this

essay is concerned is natural science, and this is no mere

phenomenon, for, as Heidegger states, "one of the essential

phenomena of the modern epoch is its science [2]."  Thus, my

intention is to display what Heidegger thinks science is -- what

kind of phenomenon it is.  To achieve such a task, several

aspects of Heidegger's thinking will be explained.  First, in

order to provide a backdrop for the entire discussion, I will

present what Heidegger thinks about metaphysical grounding. 

Second, I will discuss Heidegger's notions of 'ready-to-hand' and

'present-at-hand'.  Third, I will inquire into Heidegger's

depiction of how the sciences thematize their objects and

investigations [3].  By discussing these three aspects, we will

learn what Heidegger thinks about natural science.



A. METAPHYSICS AS THE GROUND OF AN EPOCH

________________________________________

     In the essay, "The Age of the World Picture," Heidegger

begins by declaring what the relationship between metaphysics and

historical epochs is; this relationship will provide a backdrop

for us throughout this essay.  This backdrop, also, will grant us

a way to examine natural science, according to Heidegger's view. 

Heidegger writes:



	In metaphysics, attentiveness to the essence of what is and a

	decision concerning the essence of truth take place.  Metaphysics

	grounds an epoch, in that through a determinate interpretation of

	what is and through a determinate comprehension of truth it gives

	to that epoch the ground upon which it is essentially formed

			("The Age of the World Picture," 115).



It is not merely philosophers who partake in this attentiveness

that Heidegger here describes.  Many different types of humans

partake in this attentiveness to the essence of what is.  Such

diverse figures as Plato, Aquinas, Descartes, Newton, Einstein,

etc., have shown themselves to be participating in this

attentiveness.  It is not the field of study that they are in

that determines their attentiveness; it is the thinking in which

they partake.  For most of us, however, our thinking is

determined by the problems set forth by others; in this way, we

are not really partaking in the kind of attentiveness that aids

in grounding an historical epoch.  With the help of a cliche,

most of us are standing on the shoulders of the attentiveness of

others.

     However, this epoch-grounding interpretation of what is and

the comprehension of truth grant what can be known and be

experienced by those within an epoch.  Heidegger states:  "this

ground holds dominion over all phenomena that distinguish the

epoch" ("The Age of the World Picture," 115).  Hence, for

Heidegger the parameters for our experience of ourselves, the

world, and things in the world (i.e., all phenomena) are set by

the ground established within metaphysics.  However, since the

ground and parameters, in the most immediate way, constitute our

experience by establishing what can be phenomena and what cannot,

attempting to view the ground and parameters themselves is quite

difficult; when this is usually done, one is along the way to

establishing a new epoch [4].  Heidegger states:



	In order that there may be an adequate attentiveness to these

	phenomena [of a particular epoch] themselves, the metaphysical

	grounding for them must let itself be known in them 

			("The Age of the World Picture," 115-6).



What lets us know it as the metaphysical ground?  What, also,

gives the metaphysical ground or foundation for an epoch?  What

is it that determines what it means "to be" in a particular

historical era?  It is what Heidegger calls "Being."

     Being should not be thought of as a being; it should be

thought of as the event that gives particular epochs its

meaning -- what it means "to be."  Metaphysical thinking has

attempted to think of Being as the highest "being."  Heidegger's

concern is that when we think of Being as a particular being we

cannot think of the event that determines what it means "to be"

in a different historical periods.  Heidegger points to how

Being, in the historical event that determines an epoch, has

"revealed" beings to us in a particular way -- that is, how the

phenomena in this or any historical period come to appear in the

particular way that they do [5].  However, that Being has

determined what it means "to be" by revealing beings to us has

not been thought through until the contemporary era.

     Where does this place natural science?  What is the

relationship between natural science and the metaphysical ground

provided by Being?  Since natural science is one of the

phenomena, it is also under the dominion of that which grounds

the modern era.  Natural science, then, must be understood as

grounded by the historical period it is in.  However, we must

recall our early quote of Heidegger; science is "one of the

essential phenomena of the modern epoch."  Natural science is

quite significant for our modern period.  The practice of science

as a phenomenon in the Western world is quite old, but the

majority of the types of investigations and the achievements of

modern science have never been witnessed before our current

historical period.  The activities of science transform from age

to age depending upon the activities themselves and the

metaphysical grounding of an epoch; Heidegger writes in _What is

a Thing?_:



	Science...has a twofold foundation: (1) work experiences, i.e.,

	the direction and mode of mastering and using what is; (2)

	metaphysics, i.e., the projection of the fundamental knowledge of

	Being, out of which what is knowable of beings develops [6].



First, we must understand that the "projection" of Being is

performed by humans, but only by responding to how our historical

era is grounded by Being (we cannot "project" any interpretation

of what it means "to be" willy-nilly) [7].  Also, since science

by and large participates in the activity of manipulating and

using of things that humans encounter [8], can these "work

experiences" be reduced to the metaphysical grounding by Being? 

Heidegger continues:



	Work experiences and the projection of Being are reciprocally

	related to one another and always meet in a basic feature of the

	attitude of human existence 

			(_What is a Thing?_, 66).



Thus, how we work with objects and how Being has determined

objects "to be" are intertwined.  Heidegger goes on to say that

"the fundamental characteristic [of science] must consist in what

rules and determines the basic movement of science itself" (_What

is a Thing?_ 68).  In modern natural science, this characteristic

(i.e., the way we work with things and the "metaphysical

projection" of what a thing is) are determined by what he calls

"the mathematical" (_What is a Thing_, 68).  By stating that

science has a twofold reciprocity in its work experiences and its

projection of Being, Heidegger is pointing out that science

always manipulates beings and always has a projection of Being. 

These variables of how we manipulate beings and how we project

Being are governed, in the modern epoch, by the mathematical.  We

perceive and think about all entities within the scientific realm

as quantifiable.  No entity can be thought scientifically outside

the realm of the mathematical; each object in natural science

must be quantified in some manner in order to be thought of as

scientific.  Hence, the projection of Being as the mathematical

(i.e., our response to how Being has grounded our particular

historical period) determines how we are, in natural science, to

think about and manipulate beings in our modern historical era.

     Given this metaphysical grounding of an historical period,

we can see that natural science is also grounded by this

foundation.  The response to this grounding in our modern era has

been the projection of the mathematical.  Being has determined

our foundation and revealed beings in a particular way, and we

have responded by holding that all objects in order to be

scientific objects must be quantifiable -- must be able to be

within the scope of the mathematical.



B. READY-TO-HAND AND PRESENT-AT-HAND

____________________________________

     In 1927, Heidegger published _Being and Time_, a book that

made him instantly famous in philosophical circles and has

remained one of the chief texts of contemporary continental

thought.  In it, Heidegger attempts to revive the question of

Being, which has up until now remained forgotten (_Being and

Time_, 21).  In order to revive this question, he attempted to

investigate the one being that is concerned with Being; that is,

he examined human existence (in German, _Dasein_).  In relation

to our study here, he was concerned with the everydayness of

human existence and its relation to the question of Being.  In

our everydayness, Heidegger thinks, we deal with things in an

originary way -- in a way that Being has revealed them to us. 

Our concern here will be to spell out this originary way and an

alternative way of dealing with things.  We turn to the concepts

of ready-to-handness and present-at-handness and their

relationship in everyday activities and science.

     An example will elucidate the terms 'ready-to-hand' and

'present-at-hand'.  When we are driving a car, for example, we

use all of the equipment of the car unthematically, i.e., after

learning one does not need to think about each piece of the car

in order to use it.  We change gears, turn the steering wheel,

and use the clutch and accelerator pedal without thinking "now I

will shift gears by decreasing the pressure on the accelerator,

pressing the clutch to the floor with my left foot, moving the

gear shift into 'third', decreasing all of the pressure from the

clutch, and resuming adequate pressure on the accelerator."  We

begin driving this way, but once we have learned how to drive we

drive the car (that is, use all of the equipment) without any

thematic attention.  In Heidegger's terms, these things are

"ready-to-hand"; they are directly in our use without any needed

reflection (_Being and Time_, 98).

     Although we use a thing without thematic reflection, we do

use it with the unreflective knowledge of how the thing works

within a field of other equipment that also belongs to it.  For

example, we press the accelerator pedal that provides for more

gasoline and air to mix in the carburetor -- and hence makes the

car accelerate.  Although many of us know this, when we press the

pedal with our foot we do not thematically think about this

process at all.  We "feel" the pedal and press according to how

fast we wish to go:  "the pedal" (the thing that we push) is not

distinct from our body, nor distinct from our concern regarding

where we are going and how fast we wish to go.  Not only the

accelerator pedal but all the different "tools" of our car play a

role in the "concern" for arriving on time, etc.

     On the other hand, when a tool breaks, is missing, or stands

in the way of our project, a change of perspective occurs (_Being

and Time_, 102-3).  When a tool breaks, it shows itself as

unusable by exhibiting our normal, concernful attitude regarding

the tool.  The tool then appears as a tool that was once used as

ready-to-hand in our project but now can only lie there before us

as unusable.  In our example, if the accelerator pedal broke and

started sliding around the floor of our car, we would pull over

to the side of the road and pick up the pedal in our hand -- and

see that it is just a piece of metal covered in plastic or

rubber; in Heidegger's terms, this object would then be "present-

at-hand."  This tool is not devoid of all ready-to-handness

(i.e., usability), for it can only appear as present-at-hand

within the context of our concernful use.  Heidegger writes: 

"The present-at-hand which makes itself known is still bound up

in the ready-to-handness of equipment" (_Being and Time_, 104). 

What is given in this viewing of the thing is the conspicuousness

of the unusable, along with granting us the ability to see the

context within which we use the tool itself -- but the latter in

a negative way.  The tool is thematically viewed as ready-to-hand

only when we cannot use it ready-to-hand; we can only see what a

"tool" is when we cannot use it, when it is no longer a tool.

     This alteration of our relation to the thing is the self-

imposed relation that science maintains with things.  Natural

science views objects through their present-at-handness. 

However, science must manipulate things, via their ready-to-

handness, in order to investigate their particular properties,

but when it comes to describing these properties it must do so by

altering its view of the things themselves.  In order for science

to become reflective and to theorize about its objects, it must

transform its view of its objects from ready-to-handness to

present-at-handness (_Being and Time_, 412-3).  The age-old

example of this has been that medical science has for centuries

only examined dead bodies in order to understand living bodies. 

It has, in a sense, been reversed in this century with new

technology, but it still remains a fact that the living body must

be uprooted from where and how it lives "normally" in order to be

examined.  This has been a criticism of natural science for a

long time; it must take objects out of their natural setting into

a controlled environment in order to study them.  Heidegger's

concern is not the regular view that objects are not where they

"live," but that there is a reversal in our viewing of the object

when we take it out of its environment to study it.  In fact,

there must be a change in our viewing in order for us to theorize

about the object.

     "Theory," however, does not make possible the new viewing,

but participates in the alteration of how we view the thing [9]. 

The present-at-hand is a derivative activity from the ready-to-

hand; it is no longer viewing the object from its "normal"

relation to us -- that is, the relation that is grounded in the

historical determination of our era.  The new viewing has

purposely taken the object out of its normal environment in order

to view what it is.  For Heidegger, natural science depends on

its ready-to-hand manipulation of its objects, but in order for

it to thematize its objects' properties an alteration of viewing

occurs.  Thus, what is thematized is not the object in its

relationship with us as we manipulate it, but the object out of

that context -- out of the context in which we operate with the

object in our originary relationship with it.

     By examining the concepts of ready-to-hand and present-at-

hand, we recognized that natural science must have this reversal

in the viewing of objects in order for its activities to take

place.  The scientific object is no longer "viewed" from our

natural relation of manipulation of it, but from a perspective

where the object no longer works; in fact, natural science must

place the object in this situation in order to know its

"properties."



C. THEMATIZATION OF THE SCIENCES

________________________________

     After observing the alteration of viewing from the ready-to-

hand to the present-at-hand in science, we turn to the

determination of "subject-matter" in natural science.  Also, our

concern will be what in the modern age one must presuppose within

a subject-matter (that is, what one must hold for all objects in

order for any scientific investigation to begin at all).  Early

in _Being and Time_, Heidegger writes:



	Scientific research accomplishes...the demarcation and initial

	fixing of the areas of subject-matter.  The basic structures of

	any such area have already been worked out after a fashion in our

	pre-scientific ways of experiencing and interpreting that domain

	of Being in which the area of subject-matter itself is delimited

				(_Being and Time_, 29).



Always already in our activities we have an understanding of what

it means "to be"; we have already noted that Being grounds an age

with a determinate interpretation of what is and a comprehension

of truth; in our everyday (ready-to-hand) activities we

participate in that determination by Being.  Thus, we always, in

a sense, presuppose unthematically what it means "to be" in our

manipulation of things.  We do not need to be philosophers,

scientists, or even theologians to know the (implicit) criteria

for what it means "to be."  With our everyday attitudes, we

always proceed with such an understanding -- though it need not

be very explicit.

     Science begins by making explicit certain aspects of beings. 

What can be readily seen in the demarcation and initial fixing of

an area of subject-matter are the "basic concepts" which remain

our clues for disclosing this area and "determine the way in

which we get an understanding beforehand of the area of subject-

matter underlying all the objects a science takes as its theme"

(_Being and Time_, 29-30).  Thus, any new student to a science

begins slowly by learning the basic concepts of that science. 

One does not learn the ontological grounding of that science,

i.e., how the area of subject-matter was ontologically opened,

but rather how the science operates with the area already opened. 

After learning the science, however, one does proceed to the most

essential problems; for Heidegger, science can never go (and need

not go) to the essential (ontological) questions.  Heidegger

points out that there is a large difference between ontological

questions (i.e., the question of Being) and scientific questions,

because scientific questions do not inquire into how such

interpretations of beings came about, while the ontological

questions are precisely concerned with these matters.  Heidegger

writes:



	The question of Being aims therefore at ascertaining the _a

	priori_ conditions not only for the possibility of the sciences

	which examine beings as beings of such and such a type, and, in

	so doing, already operate with an understanding of Being, but

	also for the possibility of those ontologies themselves which are

	prior to the ontical sciences [sciences concerned with particular

	beings] and which provide their foundations 

				(_Being and Time_, 31).



Heidegger is not attempting to belittle science; he maintains

that the activities of science are quite important, but what he

is trying to show is that science cannot ask certain types of

questions.  Natural science cannot ask questions about Being,

i.e., ontological questions; it cannot ask how these beings that

we are examining received the meaning they have; it cannot ask

about how this particular realm of beings was opened up.  The

questioning within a particular science must remain about the

beings it examines; it cannot ask about any ontological grounding

of these beings, for these questions remain outside the scope of

scientific practice.  Each field of science is concerned only

with the beings that separate its field from others.

     We now turn our attention to science and its relation to the

ontological.  Heidegger states, "The essence of what one today

calls science is research.  In what does the essence of research

consist?" ("The Age of the World Picture," 118)  This research,

obviously, must have researchers and must research something. 

The essence of research consists in the fact that "knowing

establishes itself as a procedure within some realm of what is"

("The Age of the World Picture," 118).  We have already noted

from the citations from _Being and Time_ that there is a

demarcation and initial fixing of an area of subject-matter which

is necessary for there to be science.  Here, Heidegger states

that "every procedure already requires an open realm in which it

moves" ("The Age of the World Picture," 118).  That is to say,

within this open realm of beings research partakes in

investigating those beings demarcated from others, i.e., those

that pertain to this type of study are separated from other types

of beings.  What the research does not, and needs not,

investigate is how the demarcation of its beings and the opening

of its realm occurred; this is not part of the science -- each

field is natural science is concerned with its beings.  Within

the practice of science, one cannot ask how the study of

chemicals has been separated from the study of atoms.  One can in

fact investigate the relation between the two natural entities,

but one cannot examine how the two realms of beings have been

demarcated (or how these beings have come to receive their

meaning).  Heidegger states in the essay, "Science and

Reflection," that the sciences are not in a position at any time

to represent themselves to themselves in order to view their

ontological grounding ("Science and Reflection," 177).  This

ground, this opening of a realm, sustains the activity of science

as the place for activity.  Heidegger adds, "The opening of such

a realm is precisely the fundamental event in research" ("The Age

of the World Picture," 118).  In other words, how the science

came about (by not only determining what beings were to be

studied but by already giving what it means "to be" for those

certain beings) is the fundamental question.  This question,

however, must remain closed off to science for there to be

scientific activity, for if a scientist continually questioned

the ontological basis of his or her science, activity would

necessarily cease.  As Nietzsche says, "the problem of science

cannot be recognized in the context of science" [10].

     On the other hand, the opening of such a realm for research

is fundamental because without it no research can take place;

there must be some realm in which beings are demarcated from

others, in order to study them.  But this newly opened realm

opens up in a determinate way and thereby beings appear there in

a quite specific manner.  We can understand these determinations

by asking how a particular realm is opened.  The opening of a

realm is "accomplished through the projection within some realm

of what is (e.g., in nature) of a determinate ground plan of

natural events" ("The Age of the World Picture," 118).  However,

this does not seem like much of an opening, for it was

accomplished by "using" an already opened realm, that is, the

realm of "nature."  We are necessarily always within some realm

of beings.  What takes place is that a new demarcation, a new

arrangement, occurs via the projection of a ground plan within

the already opened realm, and this new projection determines the

beings prior to scientific examination in a specific way.

     As we have stated regarding the ground of metaphysics as

having dominion over all phenomena within an age, the projection

with a opened realm also has dominion.  Heidegger writes:



	The projection sketches out in advance the manner in which the

	knowing procedure must bind itself and adhere to the realm opened

	up ("The Age of the World Picture," 118).



How we are to know and experience any particular thing within

this realm has already been laid down in advance by the

projection.  Thus, what is accomplished by "thematizing" is an

articulation of an understanding of Being, a delimitation of an

area of subject-matter, and the sketching out of a way of

conceiving which is appropriate to such beings (_Being and Time_,

414).  However, natural science cannot ask scientific questions

about its own thematization or ground plan.  Scientists have

asked such questions, but in "philosophical" texts about science,

not within the confines of scientific research.  Even Einstein in

his great reflections said that others can come to

(scientifically) prove his reflections true.  Within the

procedures of science only the "proof" is scientific; the

reflections, however, are not.



CONCLUSION

__________

By sketching out the metaphysical grounding of an historical

period by Being, we have witnessed that the phenomenon of natural

science is also within this dominion.  That is, how it appears

and how beings appear within it are determined by the historical

period.  In the explication of the concepts of ready-to-hand and

present-at-hand, we came to see that natural science must take

objects out of their natural context in order to examine their

"properties"; by doing so, natural science distances its viewing

of objects from our originary use of them -- that is, our

originary relationship with objects.  By looking into how a realm

of scientific activity is opened up, we proceeded and viewed how

science cannot ask about ontological questions.  These questions

remain outside the scope of the type of examination that science

does, for each field of science is concerned with its beings (not

how these beings come to receive their meaning).  Heidegger's

viewpoint on natural science is not an attempt to belittle

science, for he does think science is one of the essential

phenomena of the modern era.  His concern is to show that natural

science cannot ask about the Being of objects -- that is, it

cannot ask about how beings came to be revealed to us in this

particular way in this historical period.



NOTES

_____



1. Martin Heidegger, _Being and Time_, trans. J. Macquarrie and

	E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 51.  Translations of

	all Heidegger's work may be altered.



2. Martin Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in _The

	Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays_, trans. W.

	Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 116.



3. Although Heidegger is concerned at times with all the

	sciences, we use the term here as it pertains to the natural

	sciences in general and physics in particular.



4. The change from epoch to epoch occurs in a much larger scale,

	obviously, than the scientific revolutions described by Kuhn. 

	See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

	(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), especially ch. 10.



5. See Martin Heidegger, "The Way Back into the Ground of

	Metaphysics," in Walter Kaufmann, ed. and trans.,

	_Existentialism: From Dostoevsky to Sartre_ (New York: Meridian

	Books, 1956), 207-11.



6. Martin Heidegger, _What is a Thing?_, trans. W. B. Barton, Jr.

	and V. Deutsch (South Bend, Indiana: Regery/Gateway, 1967), 66.



7. In regards to this responding to the ground of an historical

	period, see Martin Heidegger, _What is Philosophy?_, trans. J.

	Wilde and W. Kluback (Schenectady: New College and University

	Press, n.d.), 77.



8. For an excellent description of the manipulation of objects in

	natural science, see Ian Hacking, _Representing and Intervening_

	(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), Part B (especially

	ch. 16, "Experimentation and Scientific Realism").



9. Although this will not be a major theme here, Heidegger has

	been accused of having a theory-dominate view of the sciences. 

	See Joseph Rouse, _Knowledge and Power_ (Ithaca: Cornell

	University Press, 1987), 73ff.  Heidegger's view of "theory" in

	science is prompted by his tracing the term back to its Greek

	roots, _thea_ and _horao_, meaning 'outward appearance' and

	'attentively looking', respectively.  He notes that in modernity

	"theory" becomes an observing of that which is present in its

	objectness, i.e., take literally from the German

	(_Gegestaendigkeit_) as that which stands over against us. 

	Hence, we can see how, for Heidegger, theory and the present-at-

	hand would have much in common.  See Martin Heidegger, "Science

	and Reflection," in _The Question Concerning Technology and Other

	Essays_, 163-6.



10. Friedrich Nietzsche, _The Birth of Tragedy_, trans. Walter

	Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), "Attempt at a Self-

	Criticism," section 2.