Auguste Comte and Positivism
                     ____________________________
 
                          Timothy Paul Smith

                        Department of Physics
                      University of New Hampshire
                    Durham, New Hampshire 03824 USA

                          tim.smith@unh.edu

                      (received April 25, 1995)
 
 
	How is that the same physicist who postulated one of the major 
principles of General Relativity also flatly rejected the atomic theory, 
calling it a "convenient fiction"?  We think that our methodology is 
straight forward, we proceed in our scientific investigation, following 
the directions of Francis Bacon;
 
	But the true method ... commencing as it does
	with experience duly ordered and digested, not
	bungling or erratic, and from it educing axioms,
	and from established axioms again new experiments; [1]
 
How can we go wrong?  Physical evidence is just physical evidence 
(isn't it?) and there seems to be very little room for interruption.
 
	The Positive Philosophy movement was founded by Auguste Comte 
(Isidoe-Auguste-Marie-Francois-Xavier Comte [1798-1857]).  Comte was a 
brilliant young student, who found his time confusing.  Society and 
government told citizens that, of course,  governmental and social 
structure then in existence was the ultimate  structure.  However, these 
ultimate structures repeatedly fell by the wayside during Comte's youth. 
Politically the French revolution had just past and gone with it the 
royal traditions of a millennium. Likewise, the French republic was soon 
replaced by the Napoleonic Empire.  Voltaire had introduced an era of 
religious tolerance to France, only to be replaced by domineering 
Catholicism.
 
	At the age of sixteen Comte entered `Ecole Polytechnique' in 
Paris. This was a mismatch between the military style school authorities 
and the head-strong young Comte. In what appeared at first to be an 
unusually move in concert with authorities, Comte volunteered with 
fellow student to defend Paris when Napoleon returned from Elba.  
However he probably used the opportunity primary as a way to get out of 
the Polytechnique at night. As a result of the turmoil, he mistrusted 
officials which bases their authority only on history or power.  He 
longed for a new social order and social stability founded upon a 
scientific or rational principle.
 
	He was naturally disposed towards science and mathematics.  At 
age fifteen, before going to Paris, when the mathematics master in his 
lycee in Montpellier was ill, Comte taught the class. Throughout much of 
his adult life he held an appointment as a mathematics tutor and later 
examiner at the Polytechnique. He saw within the scientific method the 
redemption of industrial society.  But first he must spell out clearly 
what was scientific, or `Positive Philosophy', as opposed what was 
Metaphysics and Theology. He set out to define an absolute, rational, 
observational or experienced based methodology for the purpose of:
 
	-There remain one science, to fill up the series
	of science of observation, -Social physics. This
	is what men now the most need of: and this is the
	principle aim of the present work to establish. [2]
 
Indeed Comte is sometimes called the "father of Sociology".
 
 
The Positive Philosophy - by Auguste Comte
___________________________________________
 
	Between 1830 and 1842 Comte wrote his definitive work entitled 
"Cours de Philosophie Positive" in six volumes.  With Comte's 
endorsement Harriet Martineau translated it into English and condensed 
it into two volumes; "The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte" (1853).  
Comte begins by placing Positivism in its historical context. He 
explains that the natural trend for the development and maturing of 
human knowledge is:
 
	The Law is this: - that each of our leading
	conceptions, - each branch of our knowledge,
	- passes successively through three different
	theoretical conditions: the Theological, or
	fictitious; the Metaphysical or abstract; and
	the Scientific, or positive. [3]
 
He suggest that not only is this true for the history of mankind, but 
that we each know it is true due to our personal experience and 
maturing. As children we ask the biggest questions about what makes 
everything and what is the purpose of the universe.  As adults we have 
refined our questions, to better match them to the world around us.  
Perhaps we have lowered our expectations,  but also we can expect to 
find answers to our adult questions.
 
	He then goes on to define what he means by Theological, 
Metaphysical and Positive.
 
	In the theological state, the human mind, seeking
	the essential nature of being, the first and final
	causes (the origin and purpose) of all effects.  [4]
 
He brushes off Metaphysics first by stating that all that Metaphysics 
does is shift cause from a deity to an abstraction; "instead of 
supernatural beings, abstract forces" [5].  Indeed it was just a shift 
in labels; the theological cause is God, the metaphysical cause is 
`nature'.  Secondly Comte contends that `causes' are something which we 
can know nothing about.
 
	Positive philosophy makes observations the only acceptable 
evidence, and the relations between observations the only acceptable 
pursuit.  As a result he rejects even talking about causes.  We can 
observe relationships - which we call natural laws, but we can not talk 
about causes.
 
		As we have seen, the first characteristic of the
	Positive Philosophy is that it regards all phenomena as
	subjected to invariable natural Laws. Our business is, -
	seeing how vain is any research into what are called
	Causes, whether first or final, - to pursue an accurate
	discovery of these Laws, [6]
 
	The best illustration of this is in the case of the doctrine
	of Gravitation. We say that the general phenomena of the
	universe are explained by it, ... As to what weight and
	attraction are, we  have nothing to do with that, for it is
	not a matter of knowledge at all.  Theologians and
	metaphysicians may imagine and refine about such questions;
	but positive philosophy reject them.  When any attempt has
	been made to explain them, it has ended only in saying that
	attraction is universal weight, and that weight is terrestrial
	attraction: ... [7]
 
	Auguste Comte summarized Positivism into four major points;
partially the logical advantages, partially the agenda for future
development.
 
	I. Positive Philosophy is the only completely rational system
(according to Comte) based exclusively on objective observations.
 
	II. Positivism leads us to recognize the necessity of 
reorganizing education.  Not only does it elevate and broaden science, 
but Positivism is a methodology which transcends the traditional 
boundaries of a scientific field such as astronomy or chemistry.
 
	III. "The divisions which we establish between the sciences 
are, though not arbitrary, essentially artificial." [8] As an example he 
cites Descate's analytical geometry as a powerful combination of 
historically separated disciplines in mathematics; algebra and geometry. 
 Comte tells us that it is only an objective and detached thinker, such 
as a positivist who realize that the boarders are artificial and that 
nature is interdisciplinary, could see the common points of the two 
fields and successfully graft them together.
 
	IV. "The Positive Philosophy offers the only solid basis for
that Social Reorganization which must succeed the critical condition in 
which the most civilized nations are now living." [9] This, more then 
the physical sciences, is what Comte was interested in.
 
	Comte concludes with an interesting comment.  He states that
although it would be very satisfying to be able to reduce all natural
phenomenon to a single law, such as gravity, that unification is not 
the goal of Positivism; Positivism is a methodology.  However since the 
boundaries between scientific fields are artificial, the laws of a more 
basic discipline must be embedded in the more complex fields.  He notes 
that a Social-natural law based on something like gravity would probably 
be so complicated that it might not really be useful at all.  Remember,  
it was the pursuit of a useful understanding of sociology  which caused 
Comte to write about Positivism.
 
Positivism since Comte: Ernst Mach and the Viennese Circle
________________________________________________________
 
	One of the most famous positivist to follow Comte was the
Austrian physicist Ernst Mach.  Mach is perhaps best known for his
"Mach number" (velocity of an object relative to the velocity of sound) 
and the "Mach Principle" (from general relativity; no absolute space, 
the relationships between inertia, acceleration, gravity,  etc.).  One 
may be able to argue that only a Positivist who has rejected 
metaphysical preconception could reject the concept of absolute space (a 
universal coordinate system which would exist independent of stars, 
galaxies or anything) and would have recognize the indistinguishable of 
gravity and acceleration.  From a measurement point of view, from a 
positivism point of view, they are the same, therefore; "Mach 
Principle".
	
	Ernst Mach was a stanch anti-metaphysician, even to the point 
of calling the atomic theory of Rutherford and Niels Bohr a "convenient 
fiction".  He maintained this view despite mounting evidence to support 
the atomic theory.
 
	Perhaps the climax of the Positivist came with the formation of 
the "Viennese Circle" (Der Wiener Kreis) of "Logical Positivist" in 
1928.
 
		In this official statement [Wissenschaftliche
	Weltauffassung] the principal aims (of the Viennese
	Circle) are set out as follows: first to provide a
	secure foundation for the sciences, and second to
	demonstrate the meaninglessness of all metaphysics. [10]
 
	In the view of the Viennese Circle Comte's writing  had three 
parts: 1) historical justification for Positivism as the climax of human 
understanding, 2) a system based solely on observations and logic, 3) 
the usefulness of positive science. According to the Viennese Circle the 
first and last points may be true, but are of no real importance in the 
development of the rational system.  The Logical Positivist were 
minimalist in their theoretical and epistemological baggage.
 
Modern Critics of the Positivist: the "Mayan Fable"
___________________________________________________
 
	The extreme view of Ernst Mach concerning the atomic theory was 
criticized in its day by the "realist" such as Ludwig Boltzmann and Max 
Planck,  but that real is just the criticism of a particular instance in 
history, a criticism of Mach's personal view.  Undoubtedly at some point 
the evidence for the atom becomes persuasive even to the most stanch 
anti-atomist. Just saying that Mach was wrong doesn't criticize the 
methodology.
 
	Many scientist, in particular theorist have taken the 
positivist to task about their denial of the unmeasurable.  Bernard 
D'Espangnat explained this in terms of the "Mayan Fable" of Richard 
Feynman.  Perhaps the historical accuracy of the fable is somewhat 
question,  but the point is made so clear that I include an extensive 
extracts.  From Feynman:
 
		For those people who insist that the only thing
	that is important is that the theory agrees with the
	experiment, I would like to imagine a discussion between
	a Mayan astronomer and his student. The Mayans were able
	to calculate with great precision predictions, for example,
	for eclipses and for the position of the moon in the sky,
	the position of Venus, etc.  It was done by arithmetic.
	They counted a certain number and subtracted some numbers,
	and so on. There was no discussion of what the moon was.
	There was no discussion even of the idea that it went around.
	They just calculated the time when there would be an eclipse,
	or when the moon would rise at the full, and so on.  Suppose
	that a young man went to the astronomer and said, `I have
	an idea. Maybe those things are going around, and there are
	balls of something like rocks out there, and we could
	calculate how they move in a completely different way from
	just calculating what time they appear in the sky'. `Yes',
	says the astronomer, `and how accurately can you predict
	eclipses?' He says, `I haven't developed the thing very far
	yet'. Then says the astronomer, `Well, we can calculate
	eclipses more accurately than you can with your model, so
	you must not pay any attention to your idea because obviously
	the mathematical scheme is better'. [11]
 
 
D'Espangnat continues to develop the story:
 
	... he (the astronomer) agreed to explain why he could not
	accept the theory.  The young man's attitude, he said, was
	quite naive and pre-scientific. The fact of the matter was
	that in the field in which they were working, all the rules
	of prediction were already available. Taken together, these
	constituted science and all there is to science.  Remember,
	he went on, only `phenomena' are meaningful.  Our rules are
	valid for everyone and are therefore rigorously objective.
	Imagining the Sun and The Moon to be material as you do is
	pointlessly to seek `explanation' of laws; in other words,
	it amounts to stubbornly introducing the old anthropomorphic
	idea of `cause' into a field where it only complicates
	description to no avail. To put matters plain and simple,
	it is to indulge in `metaphysics', a quite fruitless and
	shameful thing to do, as our most eminent philosophers will
	tell you. [12]
 
	The point is that unmeasurable concepts often do have 
usefulness.  Also a strict adhesion to positivism may cause the science 
to come to a closed end. The idea of testing the young man's hypothesis 
is unnecessary to the Positivist astronomer.
 
Criticism of the Critics
________________________
 
	I conclude this essay with an observation about the debate.  
Positivism was born as a criticism of Metaphysics,  and realism as a 
criticism of positivism. But in making their cases they set up `straw 
theories/systems', or at lest cite the extremist of the opposition.
 
	When Comte or the Viennese Circle criticized metaphysics they 
have certain aspects of particular metaphysics in mind, perhaps 
something like the Aristotelian/Ptolemy view of the planets on 
unobserved "crystalline spheres".  Their use even gives a third 
definition to `metaphysics' in the Oxford English Dictionary:
 
	1c. In various inaccurate or extended uses (partly
	based on the erroneous etymology mentioned above):
	see quotes. Used by some followers of positivist,
	linguistic, or logical philosophy: concepts of an
	abstract or speculative nature which are not verifiable
	by logical or linguistic methods.[13]
 
The `erroneous etymology' is because `metaphysics' should be understood 
as `next-to-physics',  but instead is sometimes interrupted as 
`trans-physics', `trans-natural' or even `supernatural'.  If it is the 
positivist goal to remove `supernatural' cause from science and the 
explanation of sensor events, that is to be applauded.  But are we 
forced to reject the idea that the moon is "going around, and there are 
balls of something like rocks out there" as proposed by the Mayan 
student?
 
	On the other hand, the realist that condemn the positivist for 
ignoring models and denying reality beyond sensory experience are 
perhaps also unfair. I expect Ernst Mach's viewpoint that the atom is a 
"convenient fiction" is an extreme.  Whereas the Positivist would oppose 
the title of `real' being attached to the atom on basic principles,   
undoubtedly some of that school would not object to `a strong 
hypothesis',  or even `the best hypothesis'.  I wonder what the stance 
of a Positivist in the 1990's would be,  when we `see' single atoms with 
scanning electron microscopes - or do we just see changes in the 
potential on our probe?
 
 
References
__________
 
[1] Francis Bacon, Novum Organum LXXXII.
[2] Auguste Comte, The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, p. 8.
[3] Auguste Comte,  p. 2.
[4] Auguste Comte,  p. 2.
[5] Auguste Comte,  p. 2.
[6] Auguste Comte,  p. 5.
[7] Auguste Comte,  p. 6.
[8] Auguste Comte,  p. 14.
[9] Auguste Comte,  p. 15.
[10] J. R. Weinbrg, "An Examination of Logical Positivism", p. 1.
[11] Richard Feynman, "The Character of Physical Law", p 169-70.
[12] Bernard D'Espangnat, "Reality and the Physicist
	- Knowledge, duration and the quantum world", p 144-5.
[13] Oxford English Dictionary, definition of `metaphysics'.